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INJURY-IN-FACT, JUSTICE-IN-FICTION:
TOWARD A MORE REALISTIC DEFINITION OF "INJURY'
IN THE CONTEXT OF UNENFORCED CRIMINAL LAWS
Jason R. LaFond*
"The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept ...."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Contrary to popular belief, the courthouse door is not open to all.
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution-the
Case or Controversy Clause2-puts a lock on the federal courthouse
door. Federal courts are only empowered to hear cases and
controversies; among the necessary ingredients for a case or
controversy, and in turn, a key to the courthouse door, is an injured
plaintiff.3 Without an adequate injury, one lacks "standing" to bring an
action into court. 4 This requirement has received some much-needed
attention recently due to the mini-controversies involving President
Obama and his birthplace and Hillary Clinton and the Emoluments
Clause.5  In the context of challenging allegedly unconstitutional
criminal laws, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
necessary injury to confer standing to sue in federal court is prosecution
or the credible threat of prosecution based on the challenged criminal
J.D., magna cum laude, University of Michigan Law School, December 2009; M.A., American
University, 2005; B.A., cum laude, University of Maryland, 2003. Mr. LaFond will be clerking for the
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1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 2, 1. 93 (Brian Gibbons ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1991).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
3. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Others ingredients include ripeness,
redressability, and adverse parties. See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§
101.01-101.02 (3d ed. 2009).
4. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 ("Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
'injury in fact'....").
5. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Why Some Constitutional Suits Don't Stand a Chance in Court, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 12, 2009, at A10.
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law.6 In the case of unenforced criminal laws, such an injury is obviously
impossible. This is not to say that unenforced laws do not injure, but
only that the door to the federal courthouse is closed to those who wish
to challenge such laws.
This article argues that the "prosecution or the credible threat of
prosecution" standard endorsed by the Supreme Court of the United
States7 to analyze standing in challenges to criminal laws is too narrow.
Part I seeks to counter the notion of unenforced criminal laws as "dead
words" and "harmless empty shadows" by reviewing recent research
from multiple disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and
economics, which shows that unenforced laws have as strong an effect
on individuals and society as prosecution or the threat of prosecution.
Part II traces the history and rationale of the notion of standing and the
requirement of injury and examines recent standing cases, arguing that
there is room in Article III standing for a wider definition of injury
caused by criminal laws.
II. How LAW WORKS IN THE ABSENCE OF PROSECUTION
The traditional explanation-the explanation that arguably underlies
the current injury-in-fact requirement of prosecution or the credible
threat of prosecution-given in criminal law casebooks and by those
making the law as to why people obey the law is that people do so
because they fear the legal consequences of noncompliance.8 While this
traditional line of thought has great explanatory value, it has been
challenged in areas as varied as drug use and tax evasion. 9 Even laws
with no penalties or little chance of enforcement have been shown to
induce compliance."l An enormous amount of literature has been
devoted over the past two decades to exploring alternative explanations
6. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,42 (1971).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 92-97 (8th ed. 2007).
9. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition,
113 PsYCHOL. BULL. 497, 498 (1993) (arguing that a more comprehensive and plausible perspective
on drug-use compliance is needed over the classical deterrence theory); Richard D. Schwartz &
Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CIE. L. REV. 274, 299 (1967) (arguing that "conscience
appeals are more effective than sanction threats" in garnering tax compliance).
10. See, e.g., Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting
Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 135, 138 (2007) (arguing that a law with
"negligible" penalties influenced behavior); Elizabeth McLoughlin et al., Smoke Detector Legislation:
Its Effect on Owner-Occupied Homes, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 858, 861 (1985) (arguing that an
unenforced law produced compliance).
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for compliance, and although a unified theory has yet to emerge, the
main thrust of the varying explanations is that the threat of legal
sanctions is only one method in which laws affect citizens.1 1 Law can
injure in concrete ways by inhibiting behavior, even without a credible
threat of prosecution, by influencing the use of social sanctions-which
can be just as powerful as legal sanctions-and through social
engineering, achieved through the creation, modification and destruction
of social norms and the changing of individual preferences. 12
A. Social Engineering
Criminal law, with or without prosecution, is a powerful tool for social
engineering. To label an act criminal is to make a powerful statement
about the views and values of the country. 13 This communication may
create, change, and destroy social norms-powerful movers of behavior
discussed more in depth below14-and even change individual preferences
by changing what people see as moral and modifying a person's taste for
engaging in a particular activity.15
1. Informational Effects
Scholars have shown that law can act as an information transmitter,
much like a community newsletter, informing individuals on the views of
their fellow community members, updating beliefs, solving coordination
problems, and thereby reweaving the social fabric without threat of legal
sanctions. 16 Law is more powerful than a newsletter, however, because
of the legitimacy given by law.17  A public pronouncement that
potential offenders could avoid unpleasant encounters by adjusting
11. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1603, 1605 (2000) ("Of course, no one believes that the only way the state ever influences the
behavior of its citizens is through the incentive effects of legal rules.").
12. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2029-30
(1996) (arguing that compliance is usually reached through social sanctions and norms).
13. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 363
(1997).
14. See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Dhamnika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the
Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 1, 2-3 (2003)
(arguing that law is able to have this effect in part because the aggregation of information that occurs
during the legislative process allows law to be a teaching mechanism); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649, 1651-52 (2000) (arguing that law acts as a
traffic cop helping to solve coordination problems).
17. See Shulamit Almog, From Sterne and Gorges to Lost Storytellers: Cyberspace, Narrative, and
Law, 13 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 23 (2002).
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behavior does not have the same deterrent effect as an unenforced law.
Without a legal pronouncement, potential offenders see the community
members as not having a right to shame them, and, under these
conditions, potential offenders would be perfectly willing to defend
themselves even if the interactions were uncomfortable.18
Laws are also infused with meaning and often reflect important
debates about values and priorities. Sometimes a law has very little to do
with providing punishment for an activity and much to do with
broadcasting a particular message. 19 This message can affect the social
meaning of actions by "creat[ing] and shap[ing] information about the
kinds of behavior that members of the public hope for and value, as well
as the kinds they expect and fear."' 20  This take on law is nothing new.
Policymakers have long acknowledged the importance of the "meaning"
of laws, even if enforcement is unlikely or impossible. 21
2. Social Norms
Social norms have been the subject of much discussion in the legal
community since Robert Ellickson's classic study of California ranchers'
resolution of disputes outside of the legal system.22 Norms are believed
by many to be the key to explaining compliance with the law in the
absence of legal sanction or enforcement. 23 Eric Posner defined norms
as:
the labels that we attach to the behavioral regularities
that emerge and persist in the absence of organized,
conscious direction by individuals. These behavioral
regularities result from the interactions of individuals
18. See Scott, supra note 11, at 1613-14.
19. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2023 (arguing that proponents of a constitutional amendment
criminalizing flag burning are not concerned with deterring flag burning, but instead "want to make a
statement about the venality of the act of flag burning").
20. Kahan, supra note 13, at 351.
21. See THURMOND W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 160 (1935) ("Most unenforced
criminal laws survive in order to satisfy moral objections to established modes of conduct."); see also
Hadley Arkes, Sodomy and the Law: The Forgotten for Laws Left Unenforced, NAT'L REV. ONLINE,
July 2, 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-arkes070203.asp (last visited Nov. 1,
2009) (stating that such laws are often used in custody and divorce cases).
22. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 1 (1991).
23. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMs 4 (2000) ("Most people refrain most of the
time from antisocial behavior even when the law is absent or has no force. They conform to social
norms."); Sunstein, supra note 19, at 2029-30 ("Norms solve [collective action] problems by imposing
social sanctions on defectors. When defection violates norms, defectors will probably feel shame, an
important motivational force .... The expectation of shame-a kind of social 'tax,' sometimes a very
high one-is usually enough to produce compliance.") (emphasis in original).
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acting in their rational self-interest, broadly understood
(to include
altruism and other forms of interdependent utility), a
self-interest that drives people to cooperate across all
areas of life.24
These behavioral regularities play an important role in determining
which activities will result in social sanctions,25 and the decision to
follow a particular norm has been incorporated into traditional cost-
benefit analyses of decision-making. 26 They can also have a strong
social influence, meaning that "individuals' perceptions of each others'
values, beliefs, and behavior affect their conduct, including their
decisions to engage in crime. '27
Empirical studies have examined the effect of norms in diverse areas
such as recycling28 and fisheries regulation.29 A survey of citizens in
Australia found that "[p]ersonal, internalized norms of tax honesty were
negatively related to tax evasion and moderated the effects of
deterrence variables (i.e., sanction severity), suggesting deterrence [i.e.,
threat of legal sanction] effects only when individual ethics were
weak." 30
Many legal scholars believe that law plays an important role in the
creation, evolution, and destruction of these norms. 31 Some call this
phenomenon the "expressive" effect of the law.32 "[A]n 'expressive'
24. POSNER, supra note 23, at 8.
25. See Stephen Knack & Martha E. Kropf, For Shame! The Effect of Community Cooperative
Context on the Probability of Voting, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 585, 587 (1998) ("Norms may be enforced
internally (e.g., guilt) or externally by a person's social network (e.g., shame, ostracism, or approval).
Individuals often internalize cooperative norms; even when they do not, behavior may still be
influenced by norms, if others apply sanctions for conforming with (or violating) norms.").
26. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1584 (2000) (describing the formula as "net cost direct
cost reputational benefit avoided sanction") (emphasis in original).
27. Kahan, supra note 20, at 350.
28. Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (2001).
29. Aaron Hatcher et al., Normative and Social Influences Affecting Compliance with Fishery
Regulations, 76 LAND ECoN. 448, 448-49 (2000).
30. Michael Wenzel, The Social Side of Sanctions: Personal and Social Norms as Moderators of
Deterrence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 547, 547 (2004). "The more strongly opposed to tax evasion
respondents' personal ethics were, the more they complied with the tax laws." Id. at 558-59.
31. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 23, at 8 ("[M]any legal rules are best understood as efforts to
harness the independent regulatory power of social norms."); Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2026
(describing norms as "a product of a complex set of social forces, possibly including law").
32. Scott, supra note 11, at 1614.
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theorist would argue that the law... by expressing the sentiment of the
community,.., modifies or stimulates the creation of an underlying norm
in some way. '33
Law may affect norms in a variety of ways. First, law can create
norms by labeling a certain behavior "criminal" and, thus, providing a
signal people use to determine "good" types and "bad" types; as more
and more people come to rely on this signal, avoiding the activity and
sanctioning those who do not avoid the activity may be transformed
into a "behavioral regularity," i.e., a norm. 34
In many localities [some] laws are rarely enforced
through the criminal law, but they have an important
effect in signalling [sic] appropriate behavior and in
inculcating the expectation of social opprobrium and,
hence, shame in those who deviate from the announced
norm. With or without enforcement activity, such laws
can help reconstruct norms and the social meaning of
action. 35
Second, as law can give life to norms, it can also lead to their
destruction. 36
Once we recognize the interdependence of law and
norms, it is tempting to see only one direction of
influence, and to seek to use law to shape social norms.
But law can also undermine social norms and destroy
social capital, and those of us concerned with
emphasizing the mutually shaping role of law and norms
must be equally attentive to this destructive capacity of
the state. 37
Finally, law can reconstruct norms. 38  To borrow a parallel from
33. Id. at 1615.
34. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 76 ("Just as potential mates signal to each other their reliability as
cooperative partners, so do members of the community signal to other members their reliability as
cooperative partners. One signal of reliability is participation in (costly) nonlegal punishment of
deviants who threaten or appear to threaten the community.").
35. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2032.
36. Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2057
(1996).
37. Id. at 2077.
38. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CIE. L. REV. 591, 621 (1996)
(arguing that reducing punishment from jail time to a fine "prices" an activity, thereby removing it
from condemnation and changing the norm).
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Lawrence Lessig's examples,39 if few people use seatbelts, then buckling
up in your friend's car means that you distrust his driving. Because
people wish to avoid giving offense, a norm develops against wearing a
seatbelt. 40 If, however, a law mandates seatbelt use, the meaning of
buckling up becomes more ambiguous, decreasing the costs of the
behavior and setting the norm on the road to change.41 Thus, norms
provide the law with enormous social-engineering power without the
need for formal legal sanctions.
3. Preference-Shaping
Law need not act externally on an individual to affect his behavior.
Studies have shown that, in addition to affecting the opportunities
available to individuals and the potential costs of engaging in an activity,
law may also affect behavior by shaping individual preferences. 42 These
individual preferences can be simply described as a "person's taste" for
engaging in a particular activity. 43  These preferences are powerful
drivers of behavior, as they can generate "subsidies," such as pride, or
"taxes," such as guilt.44
Law may accomplish this shaping of preferences through the
individual internalization of the norm expressed by law, affecting for
example what one sees as moral. 45 This change in preferences can be
linked to a rational pursuit of self-interest:
In many activities, people prefer partners who are
willing to pay a lot to conform to moral norms.
Internalizing a norm, consequently, increases a person's
opportunities .... [I]internalizing a norm is a moral
commitment .... People have more trust in the morally
committed person. Trust facilitates cooperation and
makes the relationship more beneficial to both parties.46
However, this change of preference may also occur because of a
39. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CIn. L. REv. 943, 1009-12 (1995).
40. Cf id. at 1009.
41. See id. at 1010-12.
42. Scott, supra note 11.
43. Id.
44. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 2030-31; but see POSNER, supra note 23, at 43 ("[N]o well-
developed theory of guilt allows us to make predictions about when fear of guilt deters people from
engaging in certain actions and when it does not, or what kinds of people feel guilt and what kinds of
people do not.").
45. See Cooter, supra note 26, at 1593.
46. Id.
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change in the social meaning of an outlawed activity "from the exercise
of free choice to a demonstration of disrespect for others. ' 47  To affect
this change in preferences:
the person or group of people who are endeavoring to
affect another's preferences have some legitimate claim
to authority over the person, or at least have the
confidence of the person.... The authority figure then
characterizes a behavior as either "good" or "bad" and
reinforces this characterization with rewards,
punishment, and education as to why the behavior is
good or bad. By characterizing a behavior as good or bad
rather than just inexpensive or expensive, the authority
figure indicates need for a fundamental change in the
basis upon which the affected person makes decisions. 48
Such a change in preferences is important because it makes it easier to
affect compliance. If people internalize respect for the law, they will be
willing to give something up to obey and enforce the law.49  This
eliminates much of the need for punishment and also builds an informal
policing force because "internalizing a law involves [the] willingness to
enforce it on others.... Internalization, consequently, contributes to the
level of obedience in society mostly by causing people to enforce the
legal obligation on others, not by causing them to obey the law
themselves." 0
One study, which used a laboratory experiment to observe
cooperation relating to contract enforcement, found that having fewer
legal rules creates a preference for trustworthiness.51 Further, "[t]he
47. Scott, supra note 11, at 1624.
48. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping
Policy, 1 DUKE L.J. 1, 17-18 (1990); see also Robert Cooter, The Intrinsic Value of Obeying a Law:
Economic Analysis of the Internal Viewpoint, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1275, 1281 (2006) ("Since
internalization of respect for the law makes governing so much easier, the state tries to inculcate it
through education and other means. The state also imposes sanctions with intentionality surcharges to
punish people for viewing the law extrinsically. If courts detect that a wrongdoer took a purely
instrumental viewpoint towards an illegal act, courts will often increase the sanction for disobedience.
In this respect, law requires citizens intrinsically to value obeying it, and the internal viewpoint is a
legal obligation.").
49. Cooter, supra, note 48, at 1283.
50. Id.
51. Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95
AM. POL. SCI. REv. 131, 136, 140-41 (2001) ("With less law, first movers have to be extremely
cautious. They have to think about their partners' trustworthiness, which makes honesty a successful
preference .... In the low-enforcement regime 53.6% of all subjects changed their behavior, and
89.2% of these switched in the predicted direction. In other words, 33 second movers breached in the
early phases of the experiment and then performed later, even though a money-maximizing strategy
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results support the view that institutional changes affect behavior, but
they also reveal that, by affecting behavior, institutions affect
preferences. '5 2 Economic modeling of preference-shaping shows that
such shaping takes place in an evolutionary context.5 3 For example, as
certain types (e.g., bad types) of actors are punished, this affects the
relative performance of different types of actors, providing a benefit to
types not punished.54 This benefit increases the number of types that
comply with the law and, in the long run, leads to more individuals with
a preference for obeying the law.5
The current injury-in-fact requirements can allow this powerful tool
of social engineering to go unchecked if there is no prosecution or
credible threat of prosecution in challenges to criminal laws. Further,
prosecution and the threat of prosecution play only a small role in
giving criminal law such power.
B. Deterrence Without Formal Sanctions
The deterrent effect of legal sanctions is the keystone of our criminal
justice system, and behavior is normally criminalized because someone
wishes to reduce its incidence. 6 This instrumental view of criminal law
goes back at least as far as Jeremy Bentham and the advent of
utilitarianism.5 7  The traditional view of deterrence has a distinctly
economic flavor, seeing law as providing punishment that increases the
risk and cost of crime, thereby making crime less lucrative and reducing
its incidence. 8  Recent scholarship, however, has shown that legal
favored the old behavior. None of these 33 subjects switched back to breaching. They became
trustworthy, even though they started by breaching.").
52. Id. at 142.
53. Steffen Huck, Trust, Treason, and Trials: An Example of How the Evolution of Preferences Can Be
Driven by Legal Institutions, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 44, 45 (1998).
54. Id. at 45-46.
55. Id.
56. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 165-66
(J. H. Bums & H. L. A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press 1996) (1789); see Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 200 (1968) ("A variety of private as well
as public actions also attempt to reduce the number and incidence of crimes: guards, doormen, and
accountants are employed, locks and alarms installed, insurance coverage extended, parks and
neighborhoods avoided, taxis used in place of walking or subways, and so on.").
57. F. Rosen, Introduction to BENTHAM, supra note 56, at xxi. Bentham stated, "The first object, it has
been seen, is to prevent, in as far as it is worth while, all sorts of offenses; therefore, The value of the
punishment must not less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offense."
BENTHAM, supra note 56, at 166 (emphasis added).
58. Becker, supra note 56, at 177 ("This approach implies that there is a function relating the number
of offenses by any person to his probability of conviction, to his punishment if convicted, and to other
variables, such as the income available to him in legal and other illegal activities, the frequency of
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sanctions are often not needed for law to produce a deterrent effect.5 9
This second-
order deterrent effect is believed to come from the threat of social
sanctions 60 and the systematic misperception of the incidence and
severity of statutory penalties.61
1. Deterrence and Perception
Deterrence is a perceptual phenomenon. Studies have shown that
people are deterred not by the punishment that awaits a criminal act, but
by the punishment they think awaits a criminal act. 62 Individuals often
do not know penalties from crimes, but instead perceive penalties based
on a normative judgment of the prohibited activity; in other words,
"analyses suggest that those perceptions reflect public preferences as to
appropriate sanctions for crimes and not necessarily actual knowledge of
statutory penalties. '63 In this way, if an individual believes an act is
wrong and should be punished-a belief that can be generated by
criminalization 64-she may perceive a punishment that fits her belief
and be deterred by this perceptual legal sanction rather than the actual
legal sanction. 65 One study of a survey regarding the behavioral impact
of drinking and driving laws found results suggesting "that the actual
nuisance arrests, and his willingness to commit an illegal act.")
59. The threat of punishment alone does not account for rates of compliance. See MacCoun, supra
note 9, at 498, 501 (arguing that a more comprehensive and plausible perspective on drug-use
compliance is needed over the classical deterrence theory); Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent
Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4
JUST. Q. 173, 174-75 (1987) (generally questioning the effect of deterrence); Schwartz & Orleans,
supra note 9 (arguing that "conscience appeals are more effective than sanction threats" in garnering
tax compliance).
60. See Kahan, supra note 13, at 350-52.
61. Kirk R. Williams et al., Public Knowledge of Statutory Penalties: The Extent and Basis ofAccurate
Perception, 23 PAC. SOC. REV. 105, 106-07 (1980).
62. Paternoster, supra note 59, at 174.
63. Williams et al., supra note 61, at 105; see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 44
(2006) (finding "[c]itizens generally thought that the likelihood of being arrested or cited for law
breaking was high"); MacCoun, supra note 9, at 500 ("[T]he general public often exaggerates the
risks of arrest and punishment for many crimes."); Robert MacCoun et al., Do Citizens Know Whether
Their State Has Decriminalized Mariuana? Accessing the Perceptual Component of Deterrence
Theory, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 347, 362 (2009) ("[N]early 30% of people living in a so-called
[marijuana] decriminalized state still report jail as the maximum penalty imposed [for marijuana
possession offenses].").
64. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
65. See Paternoster, supra note 59, at 174.
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level of enforcement in the respondent's state has no statistically
significant effect on behavior for any level of the propensity [to drink
and drive] score.... Respondents' perceptions of the likelihood of being
stopped by the police significantly reduce the propensity to drink and
drive .... ",66
2. Social Sanctions
Many people never even reach the point of considering possible legal
sanctions. As described by one commentator:
I have refrained from criminal involvement not from
any fear of a large fine (the one that could be imposed
would be affordable) nor by the fear of incarceration
(which is unlikely), but because of the close affiliational
ties and material commitments I have established.
Because the social and occupational costs are so high, I
(and many like me) do not even take the next step and
evaluate the threat posed by formal legal sanctions. 67
Such is the deterrent power of social sanctions. Several studies have
shown that the threat of social sanctions, such as shaming and ostracism
from members of an individual's social group, can have a powerful effect
on behavior, with or without accompanying legal sanctions. 68 A study
of mandatory voting laws in Switzerland found that "the legal statement
that citizens should vote apparently caused certain citizens to follow,
most likely out of civic duty or fear from social sanctions. ' 69 Another
survey found that the threat of social disapproval had three-times as
strong an effect on inhibiting illegal behavior when compared to the
threat of legal punishment.70
66. Anthony M. Bertelli & Lilliard E. Richardson Jr., The Behavioral Impact of Drinking and Driving
Laws, 36 POL'Y STUD. J. 545, 559 (2008).
67. Paternoster, supra note 59, at 211 (emphasis in original).
68. TYLER, supra note 63, at 24 ("[D]eterrence literature has recently documented that law breaking
is strongly related to people's judgments about the sanctions or rewards their behavior elicits from
members of their social group. People are reluctant to commit criminal acts for which their family and
friends would sanction them."); Kahan, supra note 20, at 354 ("[T]he perception that one's peers will
or will not disapprove exerts a much stronger influence than does the threat of a formal sanction on
whether a person decides to engage in a range of common offenses .... ); cf POSNER, supra note 23,
at 91 ("[flnformal systems of social control always coexist with formal criminal justice systems,
because the criminal justice system does not deter criminal behavior that is difficult for authorities to
detect or punish, or that occurs within subcommunities that have little political influence.").
69. Funk, supra note 10.
70. Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and
Internalization as Inhibitors ofIllegalBehavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 334 (1980).
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Law can injure through social sanctions in a number of different ways.
First, it can establish what will be sanctioned in community by
influencing signals.71 Sanctioning criminalized action is an easy way for
an individual to demonstrate loyalty to a community.72 Second, a law
making an action criminal can provide cover for those already wishing
to sanction an activity; "[b]y empowering neighbors and other citizens
to use public ridicule as an enforcement technique, these laws can
influence behavior by imposing informal.., sanctions, such as
shaming. '7 3  Law can also create a sanction that one imposes on
himself, namely guilt that comes along with the failure to honor a civic
obligation.7 4
Finally, law can injure without prosecution through social sanctions
injuring one's reputation and hurting one's livelihood. 75 In a market
economy, individuals must interact with others to maximize wealth,
whether it is getting an employer to hire you or finding someone to buy
or supply you with goods. When making these types of decisions,
people often look to deal with someone who is honest and avoid
someone who has shown himself to be dishonest. 76 This is turn induces
people to signal their cooperativeness and honesty and to avoid signals
of dishonesty that can harm their reputation. 77 One study, examining
tax compliance rates too high to be explained by fear of government
punishment, found:
[T]he average U.S. taxpayer is willing to pay around 650
dollars or 1.44% of its annual income in taxes that could
have been evaded. This extra payment is interpreted as
an effort of the taxpayer to invest in her reputation in
order to maximize future compensation. These
purchases are found to be differentiated across
professions, depending on the relative value that the
71. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
72. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 77 ("[I]ndividuals interested in showing their loyalty to the
community will sanction anyone who can plausibly, or even just momentarily, be thought a threat to the
community.").
73. Scott, supra note 11, at 1603-04; see also Cooter, supra note 26, at 1585-86 ("With group
pressures, an increase in an act's popularity lowers its cost. Imposing a nonlegal sanction on someone
often involves a risk of retaliation, which decreases as more people obey .... ").
74. Robert Bernstein et al., Overreporting Voting: Why It Happens and Why It Matters, 65 PUB.
OPINION Q. 22, 25 (2001) (arguing that the systematic over-reporting of voting results in part from the
guilt felt by nonvoters for failing to meet their civic obligation).
75. See POSNER, supra note 23.
76. See Bohnet et al., supra note 51, at 131.
77. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 18-19.
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profession poses on the value of honesty. 78
The previously discussed laboratory experiment, involving contract
enforcement and cooperation, found that cooperation breaks down as
the game nears an end, and "the 'shadow of the future' loses its power
and reputation no longer plays a role. '79
Integrity can be seen as an asset used to produce income. This asset
grows and shrinks depending on how others see us, and because we are
self-interested and seek to maximize wealth, we will invest in this asset
by complying with the law even at a cost to us because the long-term
gain of being seen as "good type" rather than a "bad type" is worth the
investment. 80  The law is a natural mechanism to allow for such
investment because it allows for easy signaling; complying with the law
signals a good type (especially if a cost is associated with that
compliance), and disobeying signals a bad type. 81
Thus, the law can inhibit behavior, lay the foundation for sanctions,
and cause economic harms without the involvement of formal
enforcement mechanisms.
III. RECONCILING THIS WIDER DEFINITION OF "INJURY" WITH THE
COURT'S MODERN STANDING JURISPRUDENCE
Standing doctrine is not a settled matter. For at least the past forty
years, as the United States Supreme Court's concern with standing has
increased, the pendulum has swung from a very relaxed view of standing
in the Warren Court,82 to a tighter view under the Burger Court,8 3 to a
very tight view under the influence of Justice Scalia in the early
78. Oscar E. Vela, Social Values, Reputation and Tax Compliance 3-4 (Nov. 2007) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author).
79. Bohnet et al., supra note 51, at 138. "[C]ooperation drops from 100% to 0% in the last round." Id.
80. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 15 ("An explanation for nonlegal cooperation begins with the
observation that people who defect suffer injury to their reputations. If a person develops a bad
reputation, then people will not cooperate with him in the future. Since cooperation is valuable, if a
person cares enough about the future he will not defect in the present.") (emphasis in original).
81. See id. at 19 ("Signals reveal type if only the good types, and not the bad types, can afford to send
them, and everyone knows this. Because a good type is a person who values future returns more than
a bad type does, one signal is to incur large, observable costs prior to entering a relationship.")
82. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53, 158
(1970) (rejecting a "legal interest" requirement for standing and finding standing based on an injury-
in-fact).
83. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757, 766 (1984) (denying standing because the injury-in-
fact was "not fairly traceable" to the challenged conduct).
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Rehnquist Court,8 4 back to a more relaxed view under the influence of
Justice Kennedy in the later days of the Rehnquist Court,85 and finally to
confusion in the early Roberts Court decisions.8 6 Given the limited
Supreme Court precedent on standing to challenge unenforced criminal
laws87 and the uncertainty of modern standing doctrine in the Roberts
Court,88 it is helpful to trace the history, rationale, and criticism of
standing doctrine to determine whether a basis exists for a wider
definition of injury by criminal law. Following that summary, this
comment attempts to show, through an analysis of modern standing
decisions, that there is room for this wider definition under any of the
competing standing doctrines.
A. The History of and Rationale Behind Standing and the Injury
Requirement
1. History
The issue of justiciability in the federal courts, which subsumes
standing, is not new. Justiciability was debated at the Constitutional
Convention, 9 and standing made its way into the landmark case
Marbury v. Madison, which established the power of judicial review.90
Standing was rarely an issue in nineteenth century cases and did not
84. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557, 562, 578 (1992) (denying standing
because no cognizable injury or redressability was shown).
85. See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24, 26 (1998) (finding standing even though based on a
"widely shared" injury-in-fact); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (narrowing his
agreement with the Court's opinion to the record in the case).
86. Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521-26 (2007) (broadly interpreting redressability
and granting standing even though based on a widely shared injury), with Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599-602 (2007) (plurality opinion) (denying standing because the
alleged injury was widely shared).
87. The facts in Younger did not involve an unenforced law. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42
(1971). The only case on point is Poe v. Ullman, where the court denied standing and declared,
infamously, that Connecticut's birth control laws were "harmless, empty shadows." Poe v. Uliman,
367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961). Poe was the predecessor to Griswold, where the Court found that a doctor
charged with violating Connecticut's birth control laws had standing to challenge the law and held the
law unconstitutional. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481,485-86 (1965).
88. See supra note 86.
89. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) ("The
motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem: con: it being generally supposed that the jurisdiction
given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature .... ").
90. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the court is, folely [sic], to
decide on the rights of individuals .... ). Chief Justice Marshall framed Marbury's commission as a
property right in order to give the Court standing to resolve the issue. Id. at 155; James Leonard &
Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers' Plan for
Federal Courts ofLimited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERs L. REV. 1, 85 (2001).
INJURY-IN-FACT, JUSTICE-IN-FICTION
reenter the Court's consciousness until the 1920s.91  Later, Justice
Frankfurter attempted to add teeth to the standing requirement "to
protect New Deal programs from judicial interference through such
devices as substantive due process challenges. ' 92 Following the Court's
acquiescence to President Roosevelt's programs, standing again fell into
the shadows.
Standing burst back onto to the scene during the Warren Court with
the growth of the administrative state. 93 Traditionally, standing to sue
was equated with the question of whether the plaintiff could demonstrate
an injury to a legally protected interest. 94 This traditional view was
unworkable with the changing objectives of litigation before the Warren
Court. 95 Litigation was no longer simply a method of resolving disputes
between private parties. 96 It became a vehicle for participating in the
governance of the nation.97 This is especially true of suits challenging
government behavior. 98 The importance of vindicating constitutional
rights caused a rethinking and expansion of standing-no longer did a
plaintiff need to show a legal interest. 99 As Chief Justice Warren stated,
"[t]he first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged
action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.... [T]he
existence or non-existence of a 'legal interest' is a matter quite distinct
from the problem of standing." 100
While the introduction of the "injury-in-fact" analysis meant to
liberalize access to courts, 10 1 in the hands of more conservative courts it
has been used to restrict access. The later courts feared a potential
explosion of litigation against the government by a nation of plaintiffs
who could use a policy disagreement as the basis for a lawsuit. 10 2 In
91. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,456,488 (1923) (denying taxpayer standing).
92. Leonard & Brant, supra note 90, at 10.
93. Michael C. Miller, Standing in the Wake of the Terrorist Surveillance Program: A Modified
Standard for Challenges to Secret Government Surveillance, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 1039, 1045 (2008).
94. Leonard & Brant, supra note 90, 15-16.
95. Id. at 16-17 ("The legal interest test had the effect of allowing plaintiffs to protect only rights that
were essentially private in nature. Yet, the signal characteristic of Twentieth Century American law
was the development, beginning with the New Deal, of a public rights model and the creation of
obligations that are intended to protect the public as a whole without necessarily vesting rights in
individuals.").
96. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4, 5 (1982).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Leonard & Brant, supra note 90, at 19.
100. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 & n.1 (1970).
101. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REv. 68, 73-74 (1984).
102. PETER W. Low & JO-N C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
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Allen v. Wright, the Burger Court repudiated a relaxed notion of standing
and sought to eliminate the potential nation of plaintiffs by raising the
bar for entry into federal court.10 3 The Burger Court redefined the
required injury-in-fact in a more narrow sense:
When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity of a
government agency, even within a unitary court system,
his case must contend with the well-established rule that
the government has traditionally been granted the widest
latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs. When
transported into the Art. III context, that principle,
grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers,
counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought,
not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation
works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the
apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill
its legal duties. The Constitution, after all, assigns to the
Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the
duty to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. 1 4
The Rehnquist Court at first continued narrowing this the definition
of injury, reaching an apex of skepticism in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, where the Court rejected Congress's attempt to create a general
injury and combined language of previous decisions to create its most
restrictive definition yet. 105 The Lujan Court stated:
Over the years, our cases have established that the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
"injury in fact"-an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.
Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to
RELATIONS 377 (6th ed. 2008) ("By the 1960s a new style of lawsuit-often called 'public law' or
'structural reform'-had developed. Such lawsuits attempted to coerce systemic reform or
curtailment of government actions, and they created a potential nation of plaintiffs. It therefore
became increasingly important to decide who had the power to bring such suits."); see also Leonard &
Brant, supra note 90, at 4 ("The Burger and Rehnquist Courts, recognizing its potential to confer
standing on vast numbers of potential litigants, retained the rule in form but began a slow process of
restrictive interpretations that has transformed injury-in-fact from a tool of inclusion to an
exclusionary device.").
103. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
104. Id. at 761 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
105. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 571-74 (1992).
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be fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not... the result [of] the independent
action of some third party not before the court. Third,
it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 106
This tight formulation quickly unraveled, however, and six years later,
in FEC v. Akins, the Court allowed a challenge against the Federal
Election Commission in the plaintiff's role as a voter, who was injured
by "their inability to obtain information-lists of... donors .... 107  The
majority acknowledged that such an injury was "widely shared," but
nevertheless held that the injury was sufficient to support standing. 108
This basically eliminated Lujan's "particularized" requirement, and the
Akins majority held that only "abstract" injuries do not meet the Article
III standing requirements. 10 9 This left the exact contours of standing
doctrine uncertain as the Court entered into the Roberts era.
These contours were even less clear after the Roberts Court's October
2006 Term, in which the Court considered two cases where standing was
a major issue. In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, the Court
channeled its pre-Akins doctrine and denied taxpayer standing to a group
challenging President Bush's faith-based programs because the group's
injury was not particularized. 10 The group's interests were "in essence,
the interests of the public at large .... 111  In a much more heralded case,
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court granted standing where the injury was
in the form of projected future rising sea levels that would injure a state
in its capacity as a landowner due to the Environmental Protection
Agency's failure to regulate greenhouse gases,112 an injury suffered not
just by the entire nation, but the entire world. 113 This injury not only
lacked particularity but also concreteness and imminence. 114  Justice
106. Id. at 560-61 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Although this
comment will not be discussing the other Article III standing requirements-causation and
redressability-with a wider definition of injury based on earlier cases, the other requirements should
not be a problem to satisfy. Cf Jonathan H. Adler, God, Gala, the Taxpayer, and the Lorax: Standing,
Justiciability, and Separation of Powers After Massachusetts and Hein, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 175, 192
(2008) ("[Amny contribution of any size to a cognizable injury is sufficient for causation, and any step,
no matter how small, is sufficient to provide the necessary redress.").
107. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,21 (1998).
108. Id. at24-25.
109. Id.
110. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007) (plurality opinion).
111. Id. at 600.
112. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517-21 (2007).
113. Id. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 541-42. The dissent noted:
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Kennedy served as the swing vote in both of these conflicting
decisions.115
This brings us to the present, a time of uncertainty for standing
doctrine. Despite the uncertainty, a strong case can be made for a wider
definition of injury under any view of standing.
2. Rationale
The danger of an unelected judiciary with the power to void laws and
frustrate the will of the majority was as much of a concern during the
formation of the republic as it is today. As Luther Martin noted during
the Federal Convention, "[i]t is necessary that the Supreme Judiciary
should have the confidence of the people. This will soon be lost, if they
are employed in the task of remonstrating [against] popular measures of
the Legislature."'1 16 This problem was lessened by explicitly limiting the
judiciary's jurisdiction.117 Chief Justice Roberts echoed these views when
he wrote, prior to joining the Court, "[t]he legitimacy of an unelected,
life-tenured judiciary in our democratic republic is bolstered by the
constitutional limitation of that judiciary's power in Article III to actual
'cases' and 'controversies.' 118
Standing is primarily a means of limiting the courts to their proper
function. "Limitations on standing thus translate into limitations on
the power of the courts, or at least on the occasions for its exercise." '119
Behind this limitation is the age-old notion of separation of powers. 12
[C]omputer modeling ... has a conceded average error of about 30 centimeters and a maximum
observed error of 70 centimeters. As an initial matter, if it is possible that the model underrepresents
the elevation of coastal land to an extent equal to or in excess of the projected sea level rise, it is
difficult to put much stock in the predicted loss of land. But even placing that problem to the side,
accepting a century-long time horizon and a series of compounded estimates renders requirements of
imminence and immediacy utterly toothless.
Id. at 542 (internal citations omitted).
115. Compare Hein, 551 U.S. at 591 (plurality opinion) (showing that the plurality consisted of Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, while the dissent consisted of Justices
Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer), with Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 501 (showing that the majority
consisted of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, while the dissent consisted of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito); see generally Adler, supra note 106
(providing an in-depth comparison of and commentary on the two cases).
116. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 89, at 76-77.
117. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
89, at 430 ("[T]he jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature.").
118. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article I1Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220 (1993).
119. Chayes, supra note 9698, at 9-10.
120. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983). An interesting alternative basis for the requirement comes from
the law and economics field:
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As Justice Scalia wrote, prior to joining the Court, "the judicial doctrine
of standing is a crucial and inseparable element of [separation of
powers], whose disregard will inevitably produce... an overjudicialization
of the processes of self-governance. ' 121 The ultimate concern is that
courts will dictate the methods used by the executive to give affect to
laws, thereby interfering with the President's responsibility to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 122  Justice Scalia would
formulate this a bit differently, arguing that the judiciary's proper role is
to protect individuals and minorities from the majority, not to fulfill the
wishes of the majority, which is the proper role of the legislative and
executive branches. 123
The injury requirement helps standing serve these purposes, 124 but
also serves its own function. The injury requirement allows courts to,
theoretically at least, hear from the best possible plaintiff. 125 If a suit is
going to be filed, it is in the adversarial system's interest to have two
well-prepared sides battling with the best legal arguments so that the
[E]conomic analysis [shows] that standing restrictions prevent the inefficient
disposition of constitutional entitlements that can result when many people's
rights are affected by a single government policy. Standing also protects
individuals' choices in how their rights should be exercised and thus promotes
the autonomy of rights-holders . . . . [W]hen a single person gets injunctive
relief he unilaterally determines how everyone in the affected class exercises
their rights .... This veto power makes strategic holdout likely. Massive social
welfare losses can result in such circumstances. Standing allows courts to
bypass the problems of high transaction costs and strategic behavior by
attempting to replicate the outcome of the bargaining that would have taken
place in a low transaction-cost environment.
Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good for, 93 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1664, 1666-67 (2007).
121. Scalia, supra note 120.
122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4; see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) ("When a plaintiff
seeks to enjoin the activity of a government agency, even within a unitary court system, his case must
contend with the well-established rule that the government has traditionally been granted the widest
latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs. When transported into the Art. III context, that
principle, grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers, counsels against recognizing standing
in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to
seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The
Constitution, after all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.") (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
123. Scalia, supra note 120, at 894 ("[T]he law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional
undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority, and
excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches
should function in order to serve the interests of the majority itself.") (emphasis in original).
124. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996) ("[The standing] doctrine has a separation-of-
powers component, which keeps courts within certain traditional bounds vis-a-vis the other branches.
... That is where the 'actual injury' requirement comes from.").
125. See Kontorovich, supra note 120, at 1672.
2009]
20 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XJJJ:i
fact-finder can make a sound decision. 126 It is believed that the person
with the strongest interest to present a good case is that person who was
actually injured.127  Additionally, "[t]he 'abstract' injury shunned by
standing doctrine may lead to an 'abstract' presentation of the issues
involved, while courts are better suited to make incremental, fact-
specific determinations., 128 As the Court in Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War stated:
Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that
indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to
cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial
resolution. It adds the essential dimension of specificity
to the dispute
by requiring that the complaining party have suffered a
particular injury caused by the action challenged as
unlawful. 129
Justice Scalia has argued that the injury requirement furthers the goal
of standing to maintain separation of powers, claiming a "concrete
injury" is one "that can separate the plaintiff from all the rest of us who
also claim benefit of the social contract, and can thus entitle him to
some special protection from the democratic manner in which we
ordinarily run our social-contractual affairs. ' 130  In his Lujan
concurrence, Justice Kennedy claimed the injury requirement is also
intended to give the public confidence in judicial pronouncements:
[I]t is essential for the public to know what persons or
groups are invoking the judicial power, the reasons that
they have brought suit, and whether their claims are
vindicated or denied. The concrete injury requirement
126. See id.
127. Id. ("[A] plaintiff without a true Article III 'injury in fact' may not have enough at stake to
invest the right amount of resources in the litigation and thus fail to properly play his role in the
adversary system.").
128. Id.
129. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974).
130. Scalia, supra note 120, at 895; see also Leonard & Brant, supra note 90, at 106-07 ("The Court
has stated that the plaintiff must demonstrate an injury that is 'actual or threatened,' 'direct,' 'distinct
and palpable,' 'concrete and particularized,' 'real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical,'
and not 'too abstract, or ... too speculative.' These verbal formulae suggest that standing is a matter
of sizing up a plaintiff for an adequate level of pain. This approach, however, misses the ultimate
point of Article III: that the federal courts are open to those whose grievances are sufficiently
different from those of others to justify diverting them from the political branches to a judicial forum.
Standing is a comparative concept.") (internal citations omitted).
INJURY-IN-FACT, JUSTICE-IN-FICTION
helps assure that there can be an answer to these
questions; and, as the Court's opinion is careful to show,
that is part of the constitutional design. 131
As this comment will attempt to explain below, a wider definition of
injury encompassing unenforced laws is supported by all of these various
rationales.
B. How Modern Standing Decisions Support a Wider Definition of Injury
The major cases that have shaped the modern law of standing have
not only left room for a wider definition of injury, they have also
provided implicit support for it. The major concern voiced in modern
standing cases is the freedom of the executive branch13 2 and the
potential creation of a nation of undifferentiated plaintiffs.133 These
concerns are not present in the case of unenforced criminal laws, which
are overwhelmingly state laws. In addition, the range of potential
plaintiffs is confined geographically to the state in question, and the
injured persons are confined to those who can show that they engage or
wish to engage in the proscribed conduct and would be among the class
likely to suffer the required injury. This is especially true if the
challenges are made on equal protection grounds, for example,
homosexuals challenging criminal sodomy statutes:
[T]he gist of the equal protection claim is that the basis
by which the class of affected people was defined was in
itself illegitimate. So it would be odd to deny standing on
injury-in-fact grounds for an equal protection claim.
Equal protection violations involve singling out a
particular class for inferior treatment;... such a class is
presumably limited and defined. 134
The first step in widening the definition of injury is to distinguish the
case of unenforced criminal laws from the United States Supreme Court
case that established the "prosecution or credible threat of prosecution"
standard, Younger v. Harris.135 The Younger case involved plaintiffs
who were not charged with a crime, but were attempting to join a suit to
131. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598, 609 (2007) (plurality
opinion); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
133. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Allen, 468 U.S. 751-52.
134. Kontorovich, supra note 120, at 1690.
135. 401 U.S. 37,42 (1971).
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enjoin a state prosecution of another.136 The Court was concerned with
the prospect of granting standing to those who were not charged, thus
allowing them to interfere with an ongoing prosecution. 137 As the Court
stated, "[a] federal lawsuit to stop a prosecution in a state court is a
serious matter. And persons having no fears of state prosecution except
those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as
appropriate plaintiffs in such cases." 138  Federalism concerns also
weighed on the Justices' minds: "[plaintiffs] claim the right to bring this
suit solely because... they 'feel inhibited.' We do not think this
allegation even if true, is sufficient to bring the equitable jurisdiction of
the federal courts into play to enjoin a pending state prosecution." 139
Both these concerns are not present in a challenge to an unenforced law
by the very fact that the law is unenforced. There is no proceeding,
such as a prosecution, where rights can be vindicated, and leaving an
unconstitutional law on the books to serve as a moral statement is not a
legitimate state activity. 140  "'[T]he fact that the governing majority in
a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.' 141 Even
arch-conservative Robert Bork agrees on this point, writing, "[i]t is
quite arguable that [the refusal to repeal unenforced laws] is an improper
use of law, most particularly of criminal law, that statutes should not be
on the books if no one intends to enforce them." 142  Unenforced laws
are thorns specifically because the state can make a moral statement and
engage norm entrepreneurs without worrying about judicial oversight.
Another common concern of the Court in standing cases is the
interference with the political process. 143  A potential argument could
go, "if these unenforced laws are so objectionable, have your
representatives repeal them." But the political process is much harder
to engage because of the very fact that these laws are unenforced.
Because these laws are unenforced, there is little political will to spend
136. Id. at 39, 42.
137. Id. at 42.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) ("Our obligation is to define
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."); ARNOLD, supra note 21 ("Most unenforced
criminal laws survive in order to satisfy moral objections to established modes of conduct.").
141. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
142. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 96
(1990).
143. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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capital on their repeal. 144  In addition, no one wants to be seen as
condoning the activity prohibited by these unenforced criminal laws. As
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice noted:
Despite this nonenforcement and the costs the presence
of these laws on the books can impose, there is
understandable and deeply felt reluctance to repeal them.
This stems from a fear that the affirmative act of repeal
might be mistaken as an abandonment of social
disapproval for the prohibited acts and an invitation to
license. Opponents of repeal emphasize the symbolic
effect of unenforced laws.... 145
When the benefits of the political process are denied, the Court
should not deny a set of injured plaintiffs redress.
Beyond the absence of any separation of powers concerns when
challenging unenforced state criminal laws, there is evidence that the
founders saw a strong need for a check on state laws that violated the
Constitution. It is doubtful that the founders would be concerned with
the details of enforcement. James Madison, feeling that a judicial check
was not enough, argued strenuously for a federal veto on state laws and
even for a council of revision to comb through state codes and eliminate
offending statutes. 146 In the end, the Convention was convinced that
the federal judiciary would have enough power to keep states in check. 147
144. Utah, for example, still has on its books a law criminalizing sodomy despite its unconstitutionality
under Lawrence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403(3) (2008); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 578.
145. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS 104 (1967); see also Erik Encarnacidn, Desuetude-Based Severability: A New Approach
to Old Morals Legislation, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 149, 169 (2005) ("[Plolitics prevent[s]
legislatures from repealing unenforced morals legislation. The legislation goes unenforced because
various political actors do not deem it important enough to merit robust enforcement. The citizens,
however, do not push for the repeal of the legislation (or even actively oppose its repeal) because
repealing it may be misunderstood as endorsing the conduct it proscribes.").
146. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 89, at 134-35 ("It may be
said that the Judicial authority, under our new system will keep the States within their proper limits, and
supply the place of a negative on their laws. The answer is, that it is more convenient to prevent the
passage of a law than to declare it void after it is passed; that this will be particularly the case, where
the law aggrieves individuals, who may be unable to support an appeal agst. a State to the supreme
Judiciary; that a State which would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very ready
to obey a Judicial decree in support of them, and that a recurrence to force, which, in the event of
disobedience would be necessary, is an evil which the new Constitution meant to exclude as far as
possible .... A constitutional negative on the laws of the States seems equally necessary to secure
individuals agst. encroachments on their rights ....").
147. Id. at 516 ("The obvious necessity of a controul on the laws of the States, so far as they might
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The Fourteenth Amendment and incorporation of the Bill of Rights
made this argument even stronger. 141 State laws should receive close
scrutiny and should not escape such scrutiny based on a narrow reading
of jurisdictional doctrine.
Importantly, the seeming abstractness of an injury not involving
prosecution falls away when compared to other injuries the Court has
found adequate. The Court in Allen maintained, "the constitutional
component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not
susceptible of precise definition. The injury alleged must be, for
example, distinct and palpable, and not abstract or conjectural or
hypothetical. ' 149  But if imprecise computer modeling of temperatures,
150 the effects of those temperatures on sea levels, and the estimates of
the effects of those sea levels on a single landowner 100 years into the
future, are precise enough to take an injury out of the abstract,151 the
wealth of social research noted in this comment should be more than
enough for the Court to allow a case to go forward. 15 2
Furthermore, the Court has been very forgiving on injury definition in
recent equal protection cases. In one case, stigmatization caused by
racial discrimination was found to be concrete enough to confer
violate the Constn. & laws of the U. S. left no option but as to the mode. The modes presenting
themselves, were 1. a Veto on the passage of the State laws. 2. a Congressional repeal of them, 3 a
Judicial annulment of them. The first tho extensively favord, at the outset, was found on discussion,
liable to insuperable objections, arising from the extent of Country, and the multiplicity of State laws.
The second was not free from such as gave a preference to the third as now provided by the
Constitution.") (emphasis in original); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("TO JUDGE with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature
it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are its proper objects. It seems scarcely to
admit of controversy that the judicary authority of the Union ought to extend to these several
descriptions of cases: 1st, to all those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in
pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation .... The first point depends upon this
obvious consideration, that there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to
constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the State
legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them? The States, by
the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things, some of which are
incompatible with the interests of the Union and others with the principles of good government.").
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
149. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
150. See Christopher Booker, The World Has Never Seen Such Freezing Heat, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK,
Nov. 16, 2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtmnl?MLC=/opinion/columnists/christopher booker&xml=/0
pinion/2008/11/16/do1610.xml (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) (discussing the recent "blunder" by NASA
where a modeling mistake caused this past October to erroneously be labeled the hottest October on
record).
151. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 541-42 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
152. See supra Part I.
INJURY-IN-FACT, JUSTICE-IN-FICTION
standing. 153 In affirmative action cases, a plaintiff need not even show
that she would be denied a certain benefit, only that she was denied the
ability to compete on equal footing-an even less concrete injury. 154
Similarly, in Establishment Clause cases, several circuits have held that
psychological injury caused by observing offensive religious conduct or
displays is sufficient injury for standing. 155 These numerous cases show
that despite often-tough language
on the issue of standing and injury, there is room for a more generous
interpretation of injury in the case of unenforced criminal laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
This may, at first glance, appear to be a solution in need of a
problem, as the only time such laws acquire widespread notice is either
when they are dusted off and enforced or repealed. Those who suffer
from the effects of unenforced laws, however, do so in the shadows;
many who suffer may not even realize where the responsibility lies.1 5
6
153. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984).
154. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 718-19 (2007)
("The fact that it is possible that children of group members will not be denied admission to a school
based on their race-because they choose an undersubscribed school or an oversubscribed school in
which their race is an advantage-does not eliminate the injury claimed .... [O]ne form of injury
under the Equal Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may
prejudice the plaintiff."); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) ("Adarand
need not demonstrate that it has been, or will be, the low bidder on a Government contract. The injury
in cases of this kind is that a 'discriminatory classification prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on
an equal footing.' The aggrieved party 'need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but
for the barrier in order to establish standing."' (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666-67 (1993))); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 n.14 (1978) ("[E]ven if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would
have been admitted in the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he lacked standing.
The constitutional element of standing is plaintiff's demonstration of any injury to himself that is likely
to be redressed by favorable decision of his claim. The trial court found such an injury, apart from
failure to be admitted, in the University's decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in
the class, simply because of his race. Hence the constitutional requirements of Art. III were met. The
question ofBakke's admission vel non is merely one of relief." (citations omitted)).
155. See, e.g., Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1084, 1087 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding standing
for county resident to challenge Ten Commandments display in county courthouse); Washegesic v.
Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679, 681, 682-83 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding standing for former student
to challenge religious portrait displayed at public school); Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d
687, 692-93 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (finding standing for residents to challenge religious symbols on city
seal).
156. This is, fortunately, not the case when it comes to the deleterious affect on homosexuals of
unenforced sodomy laws. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted
by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 104-05 (2000).
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Luckily, there has been some progress on this front. Following the
United States Supreme Court's declaration that a Texas statute
criminalizing sodomy was unconstitutional,157 the Virginia Supreme
Court struck down the state's fornication law, 158 and many localities
have begun to rescind "Blue Laws." 159 But many unenforced laws still
remain, including sodomy laws declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of the United States. 16 These unenforced laws are still promoted
by some commentators as necessary beacons of morality. 161 It is time
for the judiciary to begin thinking outside the current standing box and
examine unenforced criminal laws to determine whether they hold up to
constitutional scrutiny.
157. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003).
158. Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 42, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2005).
159. Jonathan Finer, Old Blue Laws Are Hitting Red Lights, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2004, at A3.
160. D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971, 974 (10th Cir. 2004) (denying standing to challenge sodomy law
because of failure to show sufficient likelihood of future prosecution); Berg v. State, 100 P.3d 261,
265-67 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (denying standing to challenge sodomy law because of failure to show
that prosecution was possible or likely).
161. Arkes, supra note 21.
